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ABSTRACT Understanding Europeanization through its instrumentation raises
the issue of the supposed neutrality of policy tools used as soft modes of action.
The aim of this article is to assess how this ‘new governance’ tends to guide
policy-making on a specific path. Indeed, European construction cannot be restricted
to the direct impact of Community law or to the indirect effects of economic inte-
gration. A new form of non-constraining co-ordination has been developing since
the mid-1990s. In order to explain how the cognitive mechanisms of Europeaniza-
tion work, we open the ‘toolboxes’ that allow European institutions to have an
effect on national representations and practices. The use of benchmarking for build-
ing the European Research Area, the elaboration of gender equality policy according
to the principle of mainstreaming, and the open method of co-ordination (OMC) in
the field of pension reforms, illustrate how such policy instruments lead national gov-
ernments to meet the competitiveness requirements of the Lisbon strategy.
KEY WORDS Benchmarking; competitiveness; Europeanization; gender
mainstreaming; open method of co-ordination; policy instruments.
INTRODUCTION
To grasp ‘Europeanization’ by analysing its instrumentation implies questioning
the assumed political neutrality of the instruments used as ‘new’ soft modes of
governance. After the completion of the Single Market, the European Commu-
nity entered the era of economic and monetary union (EMU) at the Maastricht
summit in 1992. New fields of competencies were then opened to the action of
European institutions, but without any new transfer of state powers. Indeed, the
dynamic of European integration is no longer solely governed by the traditional
Community method. If the harmonization of the Common Market was built on
an intergovernmental consensus which authorizes a legal order beyond the state,
the making of a supranational economic and social regulation system comes up
against the principle of subsidiarity. This principle limits the field of Community
competences to the functioning of the market. Consequently, the European
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construction is no longer built solely through supranational standardization
of regulations, but also through the integration effects of the ‘new modes of
governance’ (Lebessis and Paterson 2000; European Commission 2001).
While the institutions of the Single Market have been clearly set out in the Trea-
ties and in supranational law, the mechanisms of European policy-making have
since evolved in order to frame a ‘business-friendly environment’ – social and
regulatory conditions favourable to competitive economic activities.
Despite the great diversity of the theoretical models seeking to delimit and
define the complex nature of these ‘new modes of governance’, we can single
out some distinctive features. The ‘new governance’ models insist on the non-
coercive processes based on the will of the participants to agree, by way of collective
deliberation, on procedural norms, modes of regulation and common political
objectives and, at the same time, to preserve the diversity of national and even
local experiences. One should also emphasize the cognitive dimension of this
kind of intergovernmental co-ordination, which operates through knowledge-
sharing, mutual learning or exchange of ‘good practices’ ( Jacobsson 2001:
11–14; Telo 2001: 2). This diversification is usually explained as a pragmatic
adaptation of the Community method to the public problems with which Euro-
pean decision-makers are faced (Scott and Trubek 2002: 6–8). A consequence of
this process is that the political co-operation at the European level, intended to col-
lectively solve questions related to the Single Market environment, can no longer
function according to the logic of the smallest common denominator – usually at
work in classic international negotiations. It calls for a deliberative and decisional
framework that is more flexible and voluntarist than the vertical control of ‘old-
style governance (regulatory, top-down, uniform)’ (Eberlein and Kerwer 2002).
This article will illustrate and put into context these processes of intergovern-
mental co-ordination with three examples: the disciplinary device of benchmark-
ing in the European Research Area (ERA), the development of gender equality
policies according to the principle of mainstreaming, and the open method of
co-ordination (OMC) in the implementation of national pension reform. We
will study how the European institutions use these ‘technologies of performance’
(Haahr 2004: 218–20) in order to discipline political deliberation among member
states. We will focus on the emergence of these techniques in the 1990s and on
their progressive formalization, which do not direct by force the Europeanization
path, but control it by managing national competitive performances.
1. UNDERSTANDING ‘EUROPEANIZATION’ THROUGH ITS
‘INSTRUMENTATION’: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The meaning of ‘new modes of political co-ordination’ at the European level, set
out in the literature, can be explained by the concept of ‘Europeanization’. This
last notion may be understood in a relatively broad manner, as
processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalization of
formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of
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doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms, which are first defined and con-
solidated in the making of EU public policy and politics, and then incorpor-
ated in the logic of domestic discourses, identities, political structures and
public policies.
(Radaelli 2001: 110)
Working on the assumption that the concept of ‘Europeanization’ refers to a
dynamic process, we consider that it extends beyond the outgrowth of European
integration, only studied in terms of convergence or divergence. Rather than
examining the impact of Europeanization on national policy-making (Cowles
et al. 2001), this article sheds light on the political action which informs this
process, devises its frame and content. More precisely, we focus here on what
Claudio Radaelli calls the ‘horizontal mechanisms’ of Europeanization, ‘where
there is no pressure to conform to EU policy models’ (Radaelli 2001: 124).
On the basis of this concept, grasping the first phase of the process of European-
ization implies paying specific attention to cognitive and normative inputs, i.e.
the ‘framing mechanisms’ (Radaelli 2001: 126). Figuring out the ‘cognitive con-
vergence’ requires understanding how European institutions implement this
convergence, and hence questioning the way they choose adequate instruments.
By and large, the leverage of European institutions outside the Single Market
consists more in devising the proper tools, and less in negotiating an inter-
governmental compromise, so as to achieve a consensus on strategic goals set
in Lisbon. This cognitive form of intervention, which does not exert sovereign
power to enforce rules, brings to the fore the key instruments needed for elabor-
ating, selecting and channelling substantive ideas of Europeanization. In order
to examine how European institutions pull the strings of these ‘horizontal
mechanisms’, we propose to open the ‘toolboxes’ used to give form to political
representations and practice as a disciplinary means to direct Europeanization.
Following the approach developed by Pierre Lascoumes, the question of
Europeanization is then dealt with in terms of ‘instrumentation’. This
concept refers ‘to all the issues raised by the choice and the use of tools (tech-
niques, operational means, devices) which allow us to materialise and operatio-
nalise governmental action’ (Lascoumes 2003: 388). From this point of view,
benchmarking, mainstreaming and the OMC constitute the specific instrumen-
tation of co-operation among member states. If one aims at explaining how ‘soft
law governance’ manages to have an effect on the shape and matter of the
Europeanization phenomenon, the effectiveness of its toolbox should not be
taken for granted. Above all, one should tackle the question of methods and
study these modes of action at play. The hypothesis assumed is that their
action is actually political.1
Through our three case studies, we seek to reveal the belief system and
‘representations of the social world’ (Bourdieu 2001: 187) which underlie
these specific means of political action. Whereas their cognitive practices
(‘mutual learning’, ‘peer review’, ‘exchange of good practice’, etc.) have
already been emphasized, the normative implications that they induce are
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generally overlooked, or even played down by the allegedly neutral and
transparent nature of techniques. This article calls them into question by
describing how the mechanisms of knowledge production and diffusion
underlie the co-ordination of national actions at the European level, and thus
prescribe norms of governmental conduct.
2. PUT INTO PERSPECTIVE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
INSTRUMENTS AT THE EUROPEAN LEVEL
Benchmarking is a specific technique of government in that it stems from the
managerial field and was imported into the public sphere as a disciplinary
device. This further explains why its introduction into the European system
was mediated by the former Directorate-General (DG) III (Industry). On the
other hand, the other two instruments, originating in the social field, were devel-
oped by the former DG V (Employment and Social Affairs). After their institu-
tionalization under the aegis of the European Commission, the Lisbon Council
represents the focal point which codifies and consolidates these three instru-
ments with the objective of becoming ‘the most competitive and dynamic
knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic
growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion’ (European
Council 2000).
Benchmarking national research policies: towards
‘an internal knowledge market’
Although benchmarking originated in Taylor’s scientific management, it is gen-
erally admitted that the Japanese Kaizen movement (Imai 1986) actually devel-
oped it in the 1950s. While the technique has spread in big US firms and has
become a common instrument employed to strengthen competitiveness by com-
parison with best performers, benchmarking as an operational concept has been
formalized by the management literature in such a way that it could be applied
in all kinds of organizations. Its practical expansion and theoretical legitimiza-
tion have thus provided new public management (NPM) with a powerful
tool to increase a competitive spirit in the public sector, within national govern-
ments but also among states.
Like other administrative authorities (e.g. the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development), the European Commission acted at first as
a catalyst in promoting the use of benchmarking among firms. Since the end
of the 1980s, DG III (Industry) has striven to initiate managers into benchmark-
ing practices by organizing collective benchmarking activities. In line with the
Commission’s Communication Benchmarking the Competitiveness of European
Industry (European Commission 1996), the Industry Council called on the
Commission and the member states to carry out benchmarking pilot projects
and to disseminate the methodology among enterprises as well as European
institutions themselves. Likewise, the High Level Group on Benchmarking
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proposed in 1999 expanding areas for benchmarking activities to all ‘infrastruc-
ture conditions’ for industry, such as public services and administrative pro-
cedures, skills creation and equal opportunities, tax, health or education
systems, technical innovation and commercialization of research (High Level
Group on Benchmarking 1999). It was finally the Portuguese Presidency
which generalized this technique by introducing it to the European Council
at the special Lisbon summit of March 2000. By urging the European Union
(EU) to ‘become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based
economy in the world’, the so-called ‘Lisbon strategy’ seeks to direct European-
ization towards a ‘learning society’ model whose cornerstone would be a Euro-
pean knowledge area. Insofar as Europe’s transition to a knowledge-based
economy is a common challenge, this goal emphasizes the need for a coherent
restructuring of the intergovernmental research system.
The launching of the ERA should provide member states with a framework
of voluntary co-ordination for ‘strengthening, reorienting and opening up
new perspectives’ (European Commission 2002d). In order to support a
policy-making approach appropriate to a competitive ERA, benchmarking
appeared all the more relevant since it can catalyse the development of com-
parable science and technology (S&T) indicators, useful for monitoring
national policy ‘performances’ and the achievement of the Lisbon agenda.
Subsequently, the Research Council instructed the Commission and the
member states to benchmark national research and technological development
(RTD) policies in Europe with regard to human resources, public and private
investment, scientific and technological productivity, as well as the impact on
economic competitiveness and employment. Benchmarking has not been
undertaken as part of the new OMC. This managerial technique of ‘competi-
tive collaboration’, or ‘co-opetition’ (Mann et al. 1997), is conversely a lever-
age employed to carry into effect an operant OMC process. The role played
by the Commission does not consist in elaborating uniform RTD policies,
but rather in extending systematic mutual comparison based on the dissem-
ination of commensurable benchmarks. This technology of performance
addresses RTD policies at the European level to make them congruent with
‘an internal knowledge market’ (European Commission 2002a). Thus it
may be argued that benchmarking prescribes the necessity of competitiveness
by embedding the managerial rationality into co-operation among member
states.
Mainstreaming and the fight against gender inequalities
in all policy sectors
At the heart of the principle of gender mainstreaming is the idea that the
elimination of inequalities and the promotion of equality between women
and men must become an objective in all policies regardless of their
domain of action. The aim of gender mainstreaming is to integrate a
gender perspective into the political process and, as such, to reorient the
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policies and to modify some of their objectives because of the negative con-
sequences which these policies can produce on gender inequalities. Main-
streaming had been constitutionalized at the EU level with the signature of
the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 (Article 3.2 TEC). The idea of taking into
account a gender perspective in all policies appeared for the first time in a
Community document in 1990 (European Commission 1990). However,
the Commission only implemented it six years later when the Commission
decided to organize its gender equality policy around this principle following,
notably, the fourth United Nations Women’s Conference in September 1995.
The Commissioners’ college adopted a Communication called ‘Incorporating
Equal Opportunities for Women and Men into all Community Policies and
Activities’, which was a first step towards the instrumentation of the gender
mainstreaming principle. This text mostly lists general objectives, but it
would be followed by many methodological documents which aim at translat-
ing these objectives into practice.
In 1996, mainstreaming was one of the first experiences of cross-sectors or
integrated instruments at the European level – a type of instrument that will
be further developed in the years to follow, with the result that today it
affects sectors such as health, consumer protection, the environment or anti-
discrimination, as shown, for example, by articles III-1 to III-5. The aim is to
multiply the bridges between public policies sectors (the idea of policy linkages).
This approach was again reinforced after the Lisbon Council in 2000 during
which an integrated European approach was promoted in order to attain
renewed economic and social growth. Following this summit and the Lisbon
perspective, the Commission’s Social Policy Agenda quotes mainstreaming
among the instruments necessary to the implementation of the objectives set
by the heads of state and government.2
It is possible to isolate two arguments that led to the choice of this
integrated principle in the field of equal opportunities – each argument
borne by a different group of actors. Initially, the members of the Equal
Opportunities Unit of the European Commission (DG V – Employment
and Social Affairs) and the specialized consultants, who are part of the per-
sonnel of this Unit, imported the principle of gender mainstreaming from
the development and aid sector in which it had originally been developed
in the 1980s.
Secondly, from 1995 on, in an environment of sustained political attention,3
mainstreaming was institutionalized and twisted by a group of actors outside the
equal opportunities sector. They imposed gender mainstreaming as the princi-
pal Community instrument in the fight against gender inequalities and included
this new instrument in the framework of the ‘new modes of governance’. Main-
streaming is a mode of public action based on flexibility, the absence of legal
constraints, networking of actors, and the diffusion of knowledge and follow-
up procedures. When choosing this particular instrument, the actors in the
Commission intended to circumvent legislative and budgetary restrictions4
imposed by the member states after Maastricht.
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The OMC and the reorientation of social policies
In March 2000, at the Lisbon summit, the European Council tried to give a new
impetus to the development of Social Europe. The social dimension was, until
this decision, a prerogative of the member states, according to the principle of
subsidiarity. At the Lisbon summit, the Council took the decision to set the
social protection issues on the European political agenda and the OMC was ela-
borated as the main instrument of this new political orientation.
The choice of a non-constraining instrument illustrates a political compro-
mise, which took place at two levels: first, between the economically and socially
oriented actors; second, between the member states and the European Commis-
sion. Indeed, EMU had reinforced the weight of the economically oriented
actors (the Ecofin Council and DG or financial and industrial lobbies). This
intrusion of the economically oriented actors in the field of social protection
generated a reaction from the socially oriented actors (Employment and
Social Affairs Council and DG or social partners). The interest of the economi-
cally oriented actors concerning the issue of pensions led to an awareness:
without the development of the role of the socially oriented actors, a Social
Europe would be limited to following the evolution of the Common Market
(De la Porte and Pochet 2002). However, the agenda-setting of this issue was
problematic, because it questioned the sovereignty of the member states and
the principle of subsidiarity. Consequently, the proposition of a soft instrument
of governance was a compromise that developed European action. It takes into
account social protection issues without questioning the sovereignty of the
member states in this policy field. Nevertheless, the process of formulation of
this political orientation is still intergovernmental. The member states kept
their autonomy and reaffirmed the principle of subsidiarity at the Nice
summit. The Commission acts in an informal way, formulating political orien-
tations through a process of consultation with the intergovernmental
committees.
Several elements can explain the choice of the OMC as a new mode of action
in the domain of social policies at the EU level. First, the increasing overlap of
European and national policies in the monetary and budgetary fields diminished
the possibility for action of the member states. Second, the adjustment of
pension and healthcare policies became necessary because of ageing populations.
Third, the enlargement involving the post-Communist states, where the level of
social protection is often inferior, raised fears of a ‘race to the bottom’. Beyond
these socio-economic causes, left-wing governments were numerous in Europe
during the second half of the 1990s, and they wanted to affirm their determi-
nation in the field of social policies. Under these conditions, the OMC
appears as a ‘defensive instrument’ against the possible retrenchment of the
European welfare states due to economic imperatives (Vandenbroucke 2000).
The proposition of the OMC and its application in the field of pensions illus-
trates a new political orientation that aims at launching the elaboration of a
European social model. The objective is to counterbalance the weight of the
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economically oriented actors and to restore the balance between the economi-
cally and the socially oriented actors.
3. QUESTIONING THE NEUTRALITY OF THE INSTRUMENTS:
BENCHMARKING, MAINSTREAMING AND THE OMC AT PLAY
Since benchmarking, mainstreaming and the OMC were implemented in the
European arena, discourses on their normative neutrality, soft dimension, and
pragmatic efficiency have had a far-reaching influence. Our comparative analysis
tends to make the rhetoric of neutrality lose ground. These policy instruments
do direct public action in the member states, and, consequently, orientate
Europeanization. We will insist on the two common features of these practices:
first, the systematic quantification of the political objectives; second, the framing
of political norms and social representations.
The ‘3 per cent objective’: the disciplinary power of
benchmarking exercises
By importing benchmarking from business, the Lisbon strategy endeavours to
conform the European administrative rationale to a ‘quality’ management
style. Concerning research policies ‘of the third type’,5 the Commission has par-
ticularly targeted an increase in research and development (R&D) spending
with the aim of approaching 3 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) by
2010 (European Commission 2002c). Furthermore, the Barcelona European
Council of March 2002 decided that the proportion financed by business
should rise to two-thirds of that total. Unlike a reference point or even a
target, the ‘3 per cent objective’ has rather been set as a means of exerting inter-
governmental competitive pressure in order to co-ordinate national policies by
comparison and emulation. The ‘3 per cent’ benchmark does not convey intrin-
sically a utilitarian rationale, but operates in support of the ‘European inno-
vation paradox’.6 Once the principle of deficient investments in R&D has
been widely admitted, it functions as a symbolic instrument which points out
the inconsistency between the Union’s high level of scientific excellence and
the defect in the economic valorization of research activities.
Benchmarking national RTD policies at the European level supposes a
measurement system that translates them into commensurable indicators. So
much so that a European statistical system resulted from the ERA project,
that is ‘a space of common measurement within which things are comparable
thanks to identical categories and coding procedures’ (Desrosie`res 2000: 17).
Since 1994, the ‘pluri-annual development programme of Community RTD
statistics’ has thus laid the foundation for a European framework both legal
and voluntary, which was updated in 2001 so as to address issues related to
Europe’s investment in knowledge. Besides these statistical developments,
benchmarking leads to the translation of S&T data into action-oriented indi-
cators corresponding to the Lisbon strategy and meant for policy-makers.
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What is actually at stake is not the effective convergence of national public
policies, but coherent policy processes within a common framework, i.e. the
ERA. To this end, the Council resolution of June 2000 called upon the
Commission to set up a methodology and indicators for the benchmarking of
national research policies in order to pave the way for implementing an ‘open
method of co-ordination’ in the field of R&D. In collaboration with a High
Level Group of representatives of the member states, the services of the
Commission accordingly prepared a set of fifteen S&T indicators. However
useful this work may seem as a basis for benchmarking the performance of
the whole ERA, it is above all a contribution to an intergovernmental bench-
marking through the dissemination of results targeted at a wide public audience.
The ‘Key Figures’ device, which operates at the planning stages of the ERA, is
precisely conceived so as to induce policy-makers to undertake ‘performance
benchmarking’ in such a systematic way that the OMC ensues as a result of
member states’ involvement in the management of European ‘co-opetition’.
On the one hand, it can help to overcome governments’ reluctance by giving
media coverage to this European project. On the other hand, ‘Key Figures’
speak for themselves. Beyond their informative function, they impart a
‘graphic reason’ (Goody 1979) to the ERA which is indeed made up of
figures, tables and charts rather than qualitative analysis, ‘good practices’ or
even policy guidelines.
In support of this ‘cognitive equipment’, trust in the ‘3 per cent’ benchmark
depends upon an ‘institutional equipment’ since the reliability of the ERA stat-
istical information system and of the benchmarking technique is ‘inextricably
technical and social’ (Conein and The´venot 1997: 270). Benchmarks have
been a matter for debate and negotiation within a High Level Group assisted
by thematic expert groups (European Commission 2002b), and through
‘benchmarking cycles’7 interconnecting government representatives, European
officials, academics and statisticians. This operational work outlines feasible
policy options to achieve the ERA objectives as well as parameters to measure
progress. Beyond shared statistical information, the catchword of competitive-
ness becomes all the more operative since it is translated into performance indi-
cators and pragmatic principles. So much so that in the wake of the first
benchmarking cycle (European Commission 2003), the institutionalization of
a complete OMC process directed towards the ‘3 per cent’ benchmark was
decided by the Competitiveness Council at the 2003 Spring summit.
Mainstreaming at work: standardizing women’s employment rates in the
framework of the European Employment Strategy
Since 1996, the instrumentation of mainstreaming has been at work in
the Commission. This process has been implemented, notably, by the
setting up of a network of Commission civil servants, the ‘gender correspon-
dents’, responsible for the implementation of mainstreaming in their respect-
ive DGs. Gender impact assessment guides, good practices collections, general
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or sector-specific methodologies, control lists, follow-up sheets, scoreboards
for results and impact, formation programmes, etc., have thus been developed
and diffused. Parallel to this set of tools aimed at implementing the instru-
ment of mainstreaming, particular attention has been paid to data and
figures, statistics and indicators. This commitment, made during the Beijing
Conference, has been substantially reinforced by the initiatives of each presi-
dency of the EU.8
However, this self-imposed obligation to produce and use gender segregated
quantitative data and gender indicators has been made even more compelling
since the insertion of mainstreaming in the European Employment Strategy
(EES) – without, however, being more constraining. Since 1999, the member
states, following the Commission recommendations, have to integrate gender
equality within their employment policies and this dimension has to appear
in the national action plans which translate the employment guidelines at the
national level.9 In this framework, the indicators and statistics already developed
are used as instruments for evaluation of the progress made concerning gender
equality and employment. Moreover, in 2000 and 2002, the European Councils
of Lisbon and Barcelona set precise objectives for 2010. The aim is ‘to increase
the number of women in employment from an average of 51 per cent today to
more than 60 per cent by 2010’ (European Council 2000). Also, ‘Member states
should remove disincentives to female labour force participation and strive,
taking into account the demand for childcare facilities and in line with national
patterns of provision, to provide childcare by 2010 to at least 90 per cent of chil-
dren between 3 years old and the mandatory school age and at least 33 per cent
of children under 3 years of age’ (European Council 2002).
The process initiated in Luxembourg represents the paroxysm of a ‘govern-
ment by numbers’ reinforcing a conception of mainstreaming as a mode of
public action essentially based on cognitive mechanisms. In the framework
of the objective of reforming employment policy in order to increase the
supply of women in the labour force, the quantitative data have two main
roles. First, the data set out common objectives, ‘targets’, and also evaluation
tools – the aim is to act on political objectives and practices. Second, they
also serve to make apparent and immediately comprehensible the inequalities
caused by policies considered to be gender neutral – the aim is to act on rep-
resentations. In this last perspective, the main objective of mainstreaming is to
bring to light the differentiated impacts of employment policies and gender
inequalities on the labour market and to allow them to be acknowledged
by decision-makers. Thus, gender mainstreaming as a public action instru-
ment corresponds almost exactly to what Kerstin Jacobsson has defined as a
mechanism of ‘governance by standardization of knowledge’ ( Jacobsson
2001: 11). She underlines both the political will to build ‘objective’ and com-
parable data at the European level so as to standardize political objectives, as
well as the imprecise and vague feature of the mainstreaming recommen-
dation, which has been extensively commented on (see Mazey 2001;
Beveridge et al. 2000).
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The OMC: the instrument of a soft harmonization of pension policies
The OMC is not entirely different from the classic European method of govern-
ance; it is rather a kind of ‘mimesis’ (Dehousse 2001). The use of indicators,
benchmarking and peer review are all references arising from the EMU
process. Nevertheless, as in the Luxembourg process, European orientations
are not constraining. The objective in the long run is to elaborate a ‘new archi-
tecture’ of social protection in Europe, which would respect the diversity of the
different systems but would introduce two imperatives: a high level of social pro-
tection and the financial sustainability of the systems of social protection
(Esping-Andersen 2002).
The first diagnosis was based on a report realized by the Economic Policy
Committee in 2000 (Economic Policy Committee 2000). It demonstrated
that public spending on pensions would represent between 3 and 5 per cent
more of GDP in 2050, and would threaten monetary stability if national gov-
ernments did not reform public pension systems. At the Lisbon summit, the
Economic Policy Committee and the Social Protection Committee were
charged with producing a report, assessing the situation on pension reforms
in the member states (Economic Policy Committee and Social Policy Commit-
tee 2001). On the basis of this report, three main common goals have been
defined. First, the Commission recommends respecting strict budgetary orien-
tations and reducing increases in public spending. Second, the Council under-
lines the necessity of raising employment rates. At the Lisbon summit, a
quantitative objective was set: a global employment rate of 70 per cent for
men and 60 per cent for women in 2010. At the Stockholm summit, a few
months later, the Council fixed another objective specific to older workers: a
rise in the activity rate of 50 per cent for workers between the ages of 55 and
65 until 2010. The third objective is to adapt the pension systems to demo-
graphic, economic and societal changes, by taking into account the new
forms of employment (flexibility, insecurity, periods of unemployment) and
by guaranteeing intra- and inter-generational equity.
Even though these new orientations are not constraining because each
member state remains autonomous in its process of reform, they may have an
impact on the representation of the problem and its possible consequences.
As such, it would lead to a cognitive harmonization of pension reforms in
Europe and to a common orientation of social policies in Europe (Mandin
and Palier 2004).
4. DISCIPLINING THE EUROPEANIZATION PROCESS: THE
INSTRUMENTATION OF THE SO-CALLED ‘NEW MODES OF
GOVERNANCE’
Even though these case studies highlight the obvious ‘softness’ of the ‘new
modes of governance’ in contrast to the legal Community method, each
one focuses on a specific feature of the Europeanization process. Whereas
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benchmarking national research policies works through the use of
statistical figures denoting performances, the ‘malleability’ of mainstreaming
(Jacquot 2003), as well as the subordination of the OMC to the Broad
Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG), emphasize how policy instru-
mentation stems from political strategy. However dissimilar these tools
may seem in practice, they are moved by the same ‘management spirit’
(Ogien 1995).
From integration by law to Europeanization by figures
Discerning the political scope of benchmarking implies looking into the social
representations underlying this management technique. However indistinct
these operative principles may seem in practice, they are observable where
benchmarks are produced, before figures become unquestionable black
boxes. Since the eighteenth century, ‘the history of statistical reason’ (Desro-
sie`res 2000) has been surrounded by scientific and political controversies.
The development of statistics as a government technology has shed light on
the political power at stake. Beyond the collection, classification and interpret-
ation of quantitative data, a system of statistical information not only involves
expert knowledge and technical know-how, but also includes social or econ-
omic ideas about the polity. Thus descriptive and prescriptive activities
overlap in such a way that only the utilitarian function of figures appears
once disseminated.
Benchmarks are conceptual tools which shape the Europeanization process
through the force of positive abstractions, such as the operative ‘3 per cent’
coupled with the ‘European paradox’. Unlike the functional approach to bench-
marking as an ordinary method of evaluation (Monnier and Pitarelli 2000) or a
‘policy learning tool’ (Lundvall and Tomlinson 2002), decoding its modus
operandi entails understanding how this managerial technique converts political
issues into target figures. By working on assumptions such as the injunction of
competitiveness, it translates questionable premises into sound facts, such as the
‘3 per cent’ target. In addition, the requirement of a competitive ERA implies an
intergovernmental ‘co-opetition’ corresponding to the OMC design, managed
at the European level. Therefore, this case study illustrates how DG Research
and Eurostat have extended the scope of their powers without being legally com-
petent. Rather than acting by law and through coercive means, they operate on
the basis of a management-by-objectives device, which activates the competitive
discipline. A process of Europeanization by figures seems to replace Community
integration through law, which has until now implied that sovereign power
should be assigned to the supranational institutions. Through ‘the language
of quantification’ (Porter 1995), benchmarking aims at reconciling national
conflicting interests, to the extent that the medium of benchmarks may
enable governments to come to an agreement about ‘commensurable’ expec-
tations. What is at stake is not the achievement of ‘3 per cent’ as an actual
performance, but convergence on the same political goal.
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From instrumentation to twisted political ends
If mainstreaming is based on quantitative indicators, this instrument also works
through the twist of a toolbox which has used gender equality as a legitimizing
principle. The gender mainstreaming principle has been adjusted to the compe-
titiveness imperative, and this proved all the more easy in that the original prin-
ciple was ambiguous and malleable. The word mainstreaming itself is subject to
several interpretations. The term covers multiple meanings and contents, which
have been used to conform Community gender policies to the competitiveness
principle at work in European employment policies.
Gender mainstreaming is subordinated to the economic orientations of the
EES and it is twisted in order to reinforce employment ‘activation’ policies.
Indeed, the main objective of the process initiated at the Luxembourg
summit is to raise the employment level, and to raise and improve workforce
supply. Within this logic, ‘the first concern, from the point of view [of the
EES] is to increase women’s employment rate’ (Behning and Serrano Pascual
2002: 12).10 Consequently, mainstreaming has been forced to adapt to the pri-
ority agenda of the EES and has thus been used as ‘a means of achieving quan-
titative targets in the employment sphere’ (Rubery 2002: 16). In all the member
states, the fields in which the gender dimension has really been taken into
account related to the promotion of the development of the labour force (facili-
tation of access to the labour market, development of care structures, more
neutral fiscal policies, programmes in favour of women entrepreneurs, etc.).
Other themes, like the pay gap between women and men11 or flexible time man-
agement, are almost never dealt with.
Lastly, while the mainstreaming principle has been clearly defined and con-
solidated in a management sense at the European level within the EES, this prin-
ciple is not always operative at the national level. Following almost exactly
Claudio Radaelli’s two-phase sequencing process, gender mainstreaming
impacts on the first phase of the Europeanization processes and is clearly less
tangible in the second phase. The studies undertaken by the group of experts
on gender and employment show that it is not possible to speak of convergence
at the level of the fifteen member states. Gender mainstreaming is then less
Europeanized as an instrument for reducing gender inequalities than as a
means for promoting the development of the labour force and its flexibility.
The twisted usage has become dominant.
From the harmonization of orientations to the normalization
of ‘good’ policies
The elaboration of the OMC illustrates a political and an institutional compro-
mise. Indeed, the field of pensions, like all the policy fields of social protection, is
regulated by the principle of subsidiarity. But since the 1990s, the Commission
has taken some initiatives, in the name of the liberalization of services and
capital, in order to propose a directive concerning the liberalization of
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management and investment for pension funds. This revealed a spillover effect,
which gave the Commission the possibility of acting in a field that was not
originally accessible. The Commission has extended its capacity to
intervene, by reference to the construction of the Common Market. The
economically oriented actors, whose power was reinforced by EMU, took
charge of the agenda-setting of this issue. It led nevertheless to an awareness
process for the socially oriented actors: without development of their role,
Social Europe will be limited to the side-effects of the elaboration of the
Common Market. The proposition of the OMC comes from the political
desire to restore the ‘political balance’ between the economic and the social
actors. However, economic actors are still the more powerful: they have
managed to include the results of the OMC in the BEPG, and in 2002 they
made several recommendations, especially for the countries whose public
deficits exceeded the benchmark of 3 per cent elaborated at Maastricht. It is
conceivable that the OMC has enlarged the prospects of action for economic
actors in the field of social policies.
The OMC illustrates what a ‘good’ pensions policy should be: first, by pro-
posing some orientations; second, by identifying good practices, which tends to
classify the member states, and to define which are the ‘good’ ones, the Nordic
countries, or the ‘bad’ ones, in particular the southern countries (Spain, Greece,
Italy) and the Continental countries (France, Germany). Through the OMC,
the EU delimits what should be done, and defines what should be a good
pension reform policy. Two main orientations are promoted: developing active
ageing policies for older workers, and increasing the proportion of pension
funds in order to preserve the financial sustainability of public pension
schemes. Through the OMC, the EU is a new common forum for debate,
and contributes to the development of a common conception of problems
and solutions, which, in turn, introduces a new mode of harmonization
which is not institutional and constraining, but cognitive and normative.
A new conception of pension policy tends to emerge: it limits the augmentation
of public expenditure in order to contain the public deficit, it links social pro-
tection systems to work (active ageing policies and work pay strategies), and it
engages a movement of liberalization of pension schemes. Formalized in the
OMC, the cognitive and normative harmonization of national policies thus
disciplines the processes of Europeanization, by regulating governmental
policy-making in a conceptual and pragmatic way, which conforms to the
‘management spirit’.
CONCLUSION
This article shows that the process of Europeanization is not limited to the
direct impact of legislation or to spillover effects. Another mode of govern-
ance has been developing over several years, in a pragmatic way and in a
non-binding form. This new form of governance operates through the insti-
tution of a process of co-ordination between the member states, which allows
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them to elaborate a consensus on a common path that will then be
implemented at the national level in different policy fields (i.e. research,
employment, pensions, social inclusion, long-term care, etc.). This form of
governance is characterized by cognitive and normative modalities. The
main purpose is to create a Europeanization of problems, a comparison of
situations in all the countries, allowing for the sharing of some common rep-
resentations, opening the way to a common perception of problems, and
enlarging the choice of possible responses, thanks to the exchange of ‘good
practices’.
Mainstreaming, benchmarking and the OMC illustrate the implementation
of this new kind of governmentality. Through the norms that they propose,
these instruments orient public action, at the European and the national
levels, towards a common finality: ‘a competitive Europe’. Consequently, elabor-
ating a new toolbox for Europeanizing public policies not only uses functional
tools. Above all, it implies a comprehensive political technology, so to say a
certain governing vision and know-how. In that respect, we should remember
that Pandora’s box did not only contain evils. According to Hesiod, there was
also hope within the box, but Epimetheus closed it so hastily that hope remained
shut up inside. As a result, mankind has to rely on knowledge and technique to
remedy natural evils . . . and solve public problems. In this perspective, this
article has tried to shed light on benchmarking, gender mainstreaming and
the OMC so as to half-open the black boxes of Europeanization processes.
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NOTES
1 According to Pierre Bourdieu: ‘Strictly speaking, political action is possible because
agents, who belong to the social world, have a (more or less adequate) knowledge of
this world, and because one can act on the social world by acting on the knowledge
of this world. This action aims at producing and imposing representations (mental,
verbal, graphic or theatrical) of the social world which will be able to act on this
world by acting on the agents’ representation of it’ (Bourdieu 2001: 187;
authors’ translation).
2 Along with the OMC, legislation, Social Dialogue, Structural Funds, Action
Programmes.
3 The Beijing conference, enlargement of the EU to new Nordic member states, conflict
between the European Parliament and the Commission concerning the nomination
of the Irish Commissioner Padra`ig Flynn to the equal opportunities portfolio.
4 Mainly based on self-supervision, gender mainstreaming is an instrument which
a priori does not require the attribution of a specific budget.
5 The three types distinguished by Paraskevas Caracostas and Ugur Muldur (1997:
16–21) are, first, research policies based on ‘Defence/Sciences’ (1950–1975),
then those based on ‘Industry/Technologies’ (1975–1995), and finally the
current era characterized by ‘Innovation/Society’.
6 ‘The “European innovation paradox” (hypo)thesis, a much debated and controver-
sial topic within a confined circle of European economists, was widely discussed in
the European political sphere from the mid-1990s. Since then, it has progressively
constituted a powerful argument for changing European policies related to research
and innovation as well as industry’ (Muldur 2000: 185; authors’ translation).
7 The final report of the first benchmarking cycle was delivered in June 2002 and
dealt with four themes (human resources; public and private investment in RTD;
scientific and technological productivity; impact of RTD on competitiveness and
employment). On this basis, subsequent cycles were designed and started mid-2002.
8 Finnish presidency: political participation and decision-making; French presidency:
reconciliation between work and private life; Belgian presidency: pay gap; Danish
presidency: domestic violence; Greek and Italian presidencies: decision-making in
economic life.
9 A Group of Experts on Gender and Employment (EGGE) has been created by the
Fourth Action Programme on Equal Opportunities. The experts are in charge of the
evaluation of the National Action Plans with regard to their impact on women and
men respectively.
10 See, for example, the title of a press release from the Employment and Social Affairs DG:
‘According to the Commission, the Lisbon objectives remain attainable if the Member
States focus on women’s and ageing workers’ employment’ (6 September 2002).
11 Even if the 2001 Commission report acknowledged that the promotion of low paid and
part-time employment (which has been otherwise encouraged) can be in contradiction
to the objective of the reduction of gender pay gaps – women representing the majority
of low-paid workers. However, the demand for evaluation of employment policies,
taking into account their impact on pay gaps, seems to have largely been ignored.
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